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TECNOLOGIA, FLUXOS DE CAPITAL E RESTRIÇÕES
NO BALANÇO DE PAGAMENTOS EM UM MODELO
ESTRUTURALISTA NORTE-SUL
RESUMO O trabalho desenvolve um modelo Norte-Sul que combina, por um lado,
uma curva de demanda de capital externo, baseada na teoria keynesiana de cresci-
mento com restrições no Balanço de Pagamentos, e por outro, uma curva de oferta
de capital externo não-linear na taxa de juros, como sugerido pelo princípio do ris-
co crescente. A dinâmica do modelo descreve uma situação de elevada fragilidade
externa em economias com problemas estruturais de competitividade internacio-
nal, que pressionam recorrentemente no sentido da redução das taxas de cresci-
mento econômico ou da desvalorização do câmbio.
Palavras-chave: modelos macroeconômicos estruturalistas; crescimento com
restrição no balanço de pagamentos
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INTRODUCTION
After the “lost decade” of the eighties, when Latin America was left aside as a
destination for international lending, the nineties witnessed the return of
foreign capital to the region (Cepal, 1998, chapter III). This has been a
mixed blessing, however. Mounting trade deficits, external debt and the in-
creasing fragility of the capital account once again posed in the agenda of
several Latin American countries the problem of both currency and debt
crises in the late nineties (French-Davis, 2000). In this chapter we present a
simple model which highlights the external fragility of Latin America and
the region’s tendency to suffer from recurrent currency crises. The basic ar-
gument is as follows.
First, it is argued — as in the writings of Raúl Prebisch and the Economic
Commission for Latin America (ECLA) — that Latin America is prone to
external disequilibria stemming from its relative technological backward-
ness, which hampers international competitiveness (Prebisch, 1949, 1986;
Rodríguez, 1980, p. 69-71; Fajnzylber, 1990). This means that the rate of
growth consistent with current account equilibrium tends to be signifi-
cantly lower than the rate of growth required to absorb the population that
is either unemployed or employed in low-productivity sectors. Secondly,
the possibility of attracting more capital (with a view to financing current
account deficits at higher rates of growth) by raising interest rates is limited,
as international lenders believe that the risk of default increases with the in-
terest rate when the latter goes above a certain critical value. Both factors
produce curves of demand and supply for foreign exchange which define a
situation of external vulnerability, meaning that small variations in the ini-
tial conditions or in the parameters of the system could unleash a currency
crisis. The government enters the model in two ways: on the one hand, it
uses fiscal policy to achieve the desired rate of growth; on the other, it uses
the interest rate to balance the demand and supply of foreign currency.
This paper consists of three sections. Section 1 presents a demand curve
for foreign exchange based on a North-South technology gap, and presents
a supply curve of foreign exchange as a nonlinear function of the nominal
exchange rate. Section 2 analyzes the dynamics of the interest rate and dis-
cusses the problem of external fragility in the South. Section 3 presents the
main conclusions of the paper.
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1. THE TECHNOLOGY GAP AND THE DEMAND FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL
The literature on balance-of-payments (BOP) constraints on growth sug-
gests that demand variables, especially those related to international trade,
are the key to why growth rates differ (McCombie and Thirlwall, 1996,
chapter 5; Patel and Pavitt, 1998; Cimoli, 1988). This kind of approach is
very close to ECLA´s early concerns with the asymmetric diffusion of tech-
nology in the international economy and its effects upon the pattern of spe-
cialization, which in Ecla’s view continuously reproduces external disequi-
librium. In this chapter we take this literature as the basis for developing a
North-South model with capital inflows.1
Following Amable (1994) and Verspagen (1993), we specify the demand
for exports and imports in the South as follows:
(1) x = α1(p – w) + β1   log  —  + εz
(2) m = α2(w – p) +  β2   log  —  + πy
where small letters are proportionate rates of growth (i.e., x  = [(dX ⁄ dt) (1 ⁄ X)];
X is the amount of exports). As in Verspagen (1993), the technology gap G is
defined as the natural log of the ratio between the technological capabilities
of the North (Tn) and the South (Ts) (G = log (Tn ⁄ Ts). Equations (1) and
(2) state that real exports growth and real imports growth are, respectively,
a function of the difference between domestic inflation (p) and foreign in-
flation (w), the technology gap (G), real GDP growth in the North (z) and
real GDP growth in the South (y). S = 1 ⁄ G, the inverse of the technology gap,
is the non-price competitiveness of the South. While in the literature non-
price competitiveness is related to the quality of goods and to competitive
devices such as financing, post-delivery services, and infrastructure
(McCombie and Thirlwall, 1994, p. 284-289), we assume in this case that it
is entirely determined by technological variables. α1 and α2 are negative
price elasticities, ε and π are positive income elasticities, and β1 and β2 are
positive technology-gap elasticities of the demand for exports and imports,
respectively. The nominal exchange rate (E) is assumed to remain constant
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Balance-of-payments (BOP) equilibrium requires the value of imports
(which is the volume of imports, M, multiplied by the price of imports de-
nominated in domestic currency, WE) to equal the value of exports plus F,
the net capital inflows in domestic currency, i.e., WEM = WM = PX + PF
(Thirlwall and Hussain, 1982). Taking logarithms and differentiating with
respect to time, we get:
(3) w + m = a(p + x) + (1 – a)(f – p)
where a = PX ⁄ (PX + F) is the participation of nominal exports in total for-
eign exchange earnings (in domestic currency units) and f =
 dF  ⁄ dt
. Substi-
F
tuting from equations (1) and (2) into (3) we get the rate of growth of the
South consistent with BOP equilibrium (ye):
(1 + a) (α1 + α2) (p – w) + a (β1 = β2) ln — + aεz + (1 – a)f
(4) ye = π
If in the long run the real exchange rate adjusts to purchasing power par-
ity (p = w), equation (4) turns into (5):
(5) ye = 
aβS + aεz + (1 – a)f
π
where β = (β1 + β2) and S = 1 ⁄ G = ln (Ts ⁄ Tn).
Finally, we will assume that G is solely determined at a technological
level, according to a linear North-South diffusion curve (as in Fagerberg,
1988a and 1998b), given by
(6) 
dS
 = µ  – µ  —— – p
dt
where µ is a measure of the local effort at technological imitation in the
South and ρ is the exogenous rate of technological innovation in the North.
By assumption, µ > ρ. Equation (6) gives a stable equilibrium solution for
the capabilities ratio (Ts ⁄ Tn)* = (µ – ρ) ⁄ µ and therefore for G and S.
In what follows we will assume that the technology gap is always in equilib-
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(7) ye = 
1
 [aβSe + aε z + (1 – a)f ]
π
where Se = log [(µ – ρ) /µ] < 0.
Equation (7) endogenously determines the rate of growth of the South
given its non-price competitiveness, the rate of growth of the rest of the
world, and real capital inflows.
Let us now look at equation (7) from a different perspective. If we as-
sume that there exists a desired rate of growth (yd) for the South (see be-
low), to which the government is committed and which it actively pursues
(for instance, through an expansionary fiscal policy), we can write (7) as a
demand equation for foreign currency given the rate of growth:
(8) fd = ——— [πyd – aβSe – aεz]
where fd = 
dFd ⁄ dt
  is the proportionate rate of growth of capital inflows (Fd)
Fd
the South will have to obtain in the international markets in order to sustain
yd, given non-price competitiveness (as mentioned, a function of the pa-
rameters of North-South technological diffusion), the rate of growth of the
North, and the participation of capital inflows in the BOP (1 – a).
We define the desired rate of growth of Southern economies as the rate of
growth that produces full employment. This is the objective governments
seek to achieve by using conventional fiscal instruments. In a dual economy
with a large low-productivity sector, this objective means that the modern
sector must grow at a rate capable of producing the employment required to
absorb not only the vegetative growth of the work force, but also the people
forced to abandon the low-productivity subsistence sector. The desired rate
of growth is taken as exogenous in the model, but there is a vast literature illus-
trating how it is determined. It will be a function of the size of the subsis-
tence sector, the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital, and the
impact of international trade and technological change on the low-produc-
tivity sector (Rodríguez, 1980, p. 98-107; Ros, 2000, p. 71-76). For our pur-
poses, it suffices to say that yd is such that πyd > aβSe + aεz,2 which makes the
assistance of foreign lending necessary to keep the BOP in equilibrium.
We will initially assume that the desired rate of growth yd is always
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clearer demonstration of the barriers to full employment that emerge in a
context of external fragility. This assumption, however, is highly unrealistic.
Therefore, we subsequently assume that the effective rate of growth the
economy can attain (and which the government is actually able to sustain)
falls as the interest rate rises. In other words, yd is no longer an exogenous
constant but a function of the interest rate yd(i), where [δ(yd) ⁄ δi] is nega-
tive. Higher interest rates depress investment and heighten the burden of
public and private debt. As a result, yd is no longer the full employment rate
of growth, but a more modest rate of growth the economy succeeds in ob-
taining in an increasingly less favorable environment. In this case the gap
between the full employment rate of growth and the effective rate of growth
becomes larger as the interest rate increases.
It should be observed that the model gives inflation no role in shaping
long-run growth. As it is assumed that (i) purchasing power parity holds,
(ii) the exchange rate is fixed, (iii) foreign inflation is constant, and (iv)
growth is only constrained by external disequilibrium, then domestic infla-
tion is an exogenous constant which does not affect competitiveness and
therefore could not affect growth. These assumptions are of course highly
restrictive. The efforts by the government to achieve full employment
through fiscal policy should probably lead to some crowding-out in the
long run and to adjustments through prices as well as through output. Still,
these assumptions are useful when the focus lies on structural constraints in
the presence of technological backwardness. Moreover, these are standard
assumptions in Balance-of-Payments-constrained-growth models, which
we have preferred to maintain in order to make the model tractable.
 We now direct our attention to the supply of foreign capital. The supply
of capital from the North is modeled as a non-linear differential equation
on the interest rate, where fs is the proportional rate of growth of the supply
of foreign capital, Fs:
(9) fs = 
[dFs ⁄dt]
 = b0i – b1i
2
Fs
The basic idea (drawn from Curado, 2000, and Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)
is that up to a certain point North agents increase their investments in
Southern bonds as the interest rate increases. However, once a critical value
for the interest rate is surpassed (i = b0 ⁄ 2b1), agents regard further increases
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in the interest rate as potentially destabilizing and as an indication of exter-
nal vulnerability. In short, growing interest rates beyond the critical point
are associated with an increasing risk of default. Northern investors will
therefore reduce the rate of growth of investment in Southern bonds. In
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), higher interest rates lead to adverse selection (as
more prudent and reliable borrowers exit the credit market) and to a moral
hazard (as agents investing in highly risky projects, with very low probabil-
ity of success, are stimulated to take credits). This implies that there exists
an interest rate that maximizes the expected returns from lending. Such an
idea, defined at a micro level, could be extended to a macro level with a view
to analyzing the evolution of international lending to Southern countries.
In the next section both curves are placed together. It will be argued that
they define a situation of high external fragility in the South stemming from
the technological asymmetry that hampers Southern exports, and the inef-
fectiveness of the interest rate policy to equilibrate the market for foreign
exchange.
2. INTEREST RATE DYNAMICS AND EXTERNAL FRAGILITY
(a) The case of the horizontal desired growth rate
Equilibrium between supply and demand of Southern bonds is achieved
through variations in the interest rate. We will assume static expectations
about the exchange rate as long as the interest rate can work as an effective
policy instrument (i.e., it succeeds in balancing the supply and demand of
foreign exchange). In other words, the foreign exchange market is in equi-
librium with a constant real and nominal exchange rate and when there is
no expectation of devaluation. But when the interest rate can no longer play
this role a currency crisis may occur. It should be noted that the model is
not intended to endogenously produce a currency crisis. It just describes
why Southern economies with BOP constraints on growth are more likely
to suffer this kind of crises or, at the very least, to recurrently experience se-
rious pressure for devaluating or for reducing their rate of growth.
As mentioned, we will firstly assume that the desired rate of growth (full
employment growth) does equal the effective rate of growth. Under this as-
sumption, equation (10) describes the motion of the interest rate as a func-
tion of the excess of demand for foreign currency (fd – fs):
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(10) 
di
 = ν ——— (πyd – aβSe – aεz) – b0i +b1i2
dt 1 – a
where ν is positive.
The graphic in figure 1 describes the dynamic behavior of the variables
in equation (10). When the horizontal line representing the rate of growth
of the demand for capital inflows is above the curve that gives the rate of
growth at which foreign capital is offered by Northern investors, the interest
rate must be increasing. Inversely, when capital is supplied at a higher rate
of growth than demanded by Southern investors, the interest rate falls. The
interest rate thus adjusts the rate of growth of the demand and supply of
foreign capital. In equilibrium, both rates of growth are equal and the cen-
tral bank reserves remain stable.
The system thus shows two equilibrium solutions, points A and B in fig-
ure 1, where f s = f d and the interest rate is steady. Are these points stable? In
order to answer this question we must look at di ⁄ dt in the vicinity of the
equilibrium values of the interest rate. Let us first look at i1. For points to
the left of i1 di ⁄ dt is positive, hence the interest rate increases. For points to
the right of i1 di ⁄ dt is negative and the interest rate falls; i1 is therefore an
attractor (stable). Inversely, to the left (right) of i2 di ⁄ dt is negative (posi-
tive), hence i2 is a repeller (unstable).
The model asserts that when the interest rate is higher than i2 it will be


















Figure 1: Changes in the fd curve
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serves (stemming from the asymmetry in the growth of the demand and
supply of foreign capital). An increase in the demand of foreign capital in-
creases the interest rate, but this fails to attract new capital because of the
perception that the risk of default is growing. A higher interest rate is in this
case destabilizing and moves the system away from equilibrium.
In sum, there is a stable equilibrium (at i1 in point A) and an unstable
equilibrium (at iB in point B) for the interest rate. Beginning from any point
within a certain interval of i (between i2 and iB), the economy will move to-
wards the stable equilibrium. This defines the stability region in which the
South will be able to get the foreign exchange it needs to achieve the desired
growth rate.3
There are two potential sources of instability.
First, there exists a value of yd for which a stable equilibrium ceases to be
possible. This critical value of yd represents a bifurcation point, as the quali-
tative behavior of the system changes when this value is surpassed. If yd is
high enough, the straight line fd will never cut the fs curve, the interest rate
will increase boundlessly and foreign exchange reserves will evaporate. The
line fd2 illustrates such a case in figure 1. In addition, any negative exog-
enous shocks in the other variables shaping fd (for instance, a positive tech-
nological shock in the North increasing the technology gap or a negative
demand shock reducing the rate of growth of the North) may move fd up-
wards and take it irreversibly away from the stability path.
Secondly, as already mentioned, even when fd cuts fs, for i > i2, the inter-
est rate ceases to work as an effective instrument for achieving external
equilibrium. When the fd curve is far from its origin (as in fd2), the instability
region is already very large. Any minor aleatory shock either in the interest
rate or in the position of the fd line will place i in the instability region.
Changes in the demand curve are not the only factor affecting the stabil-
ity of the debt path. Changes in the position of the fs curve can also play a
similar role. fs will move as a result of alterations in the parameters b0 and b1,
which reflect the lenders’ perceptions of the risk of increasing their invest-
ments in Southern bonds. As in the case of the desired rate of growth, there
exists a certain combination of b0 and b1 that represents a bifurcation point
— no equilibrium is possible for the system when b0 ⁄ db1 is below this criti-
cal value. Figure 2 illustrates that case, assuming that b0 falls and b1 increases
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(for instance, because of a contagion effect from other countries). In this
particular example, the alteration in the parameters of the supply curve
makes stability impossible at the previous rate of growth. Either the govern-
ment alters its fiscal policy, bringing about a fall in the rate of growth (in
our model, this implies a downward revision of yd), or it gives way to de-
valuation.
b) The case of a downward-sloping curve of effective growth, yd(i)
The assumption that the government always attains the full-employment
growth rate is implausible, as higher interest rates will be associated with
crowding-out in capital markets, higher uncertainty, and less stimulus for
private and public investment. It is more reasonable to suppose that the
government will accept a higher level of unemployment as the interest rate
increases, or that it will simply admit it has neither the power nor the instru-
ments required to implement its preferred policy. As a result, the effective
rate of growth will decline as the interest rate escalates. The motion of the
interest rate will be described, in this case, by equation (11):
(11) 
di
 = ν ——— (πg – πhi – αβSe – aεz) – b0i +b1i2
dt 1 – a
where we assume the effective rate of growth to fall linearly according to yd
= g – hi.
Figure 2: Changes in the fs curve
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Such a situation does not qualitatively alter the analysis presented in the
previous section. This can be seen in figure 3.
There are still a stable and an unstable equilibrium value for the interest
rate. The regions of potential instability still depend on the parameters of
the capital supply curve (b0 and b1), on technological competitiveness, and
on the effective rate of economic growth. However, the revised demand
function does lead to a difference in terms of the magnitude of the region of
instability. In view of its downward slope, the new demand curve allows for
a broader range of values of the parameters and of the interest rate that pro-
duce a stable equilibrium. Figure 3 shows the broadening of the instability
region when fd shifts outwards (the new stable equilibrium is obtained at iB
rather than at iA), now assuming a declining effective rate of growth. It can
be seen that potential instability increases when fd shifts, but to a lesser ex-
tent than in the previous model.
As already mentioned, however, the basic conclusion about the existence
of a significant potential for external fragility and instability in Southern
economies will remain in place in both cases. Moreover, the increase in the
degrees of stability of this variant of the model results from the admission
that full employment ceases to be a plausible policy option. The basic mes-
sage — the difficulty to keep full employment in a context of weak struc-
tural competitiveness — thus remains unaffected.
Figure 3: The case of a downward-sloping curfe of effective growth, yd(i)
f s, f d
i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4
f d1
f d2
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3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have taken as a point of departure a BOP-constrained growth model
with capital inflows which we modified in two ways. First, we assumed that
governments are committed to attain a desired rate of growth. As a result,
we obtained a demand function for foreign exchange which gives the rate of
capital inflows that equilibrate the BOP at the desired growth rate. Secondly,
we set forth a supply function of capital inflows which is non-linear on the
interest rate. For the sake of simplicity we have ignored foreign direct in-
vestment and other forms of capital inflows which do not depend on the
interest rate. Combining both the supply and demand functions of foreign
exchange we produced a framework in which the external fragility of the
South is highlighted: the South faces a recurrent external disequilibrium
(which the interest rate cannot correct) when it tries to attain the desired
rate of growth.
Both North and South may seek to achieve a rate of growth compatible
with full employment. But in the South this objective becomes particularly
difficult to attain. The existence of a labor surplus puts more pressure on
the labor market in the South. And the fact that S* is negative imposes a
stronger dependence on foreign lending. The result is an fd curve far from
the origin and closer to the point of structural instability, which in turn is
associated to external vulnerability. If we admit that the effective rate of
growth is systematically lower than the desired rate of growth when the in-
terest rate rises, the scope for instability is reduced, but the qualitative prop-
erties of the system remain unaltered.
NOTES
1. Moreno-Brid (1998-1999) offers a very interesting model in which capital flows and
BOP - constrained growth are combined. Still, as our primary interest concerns external
fragility and the possibility of currency crises, we focus on the role of the interest rate in
attracting foreign capital.
2. This condition implies that capital inflows are necessary to equilibrate the balance of pay-
ments, as the effective rate of growth surpasses the rate of growth compatible with equi-
librium in current account. Such a condition is not difficult to hold, since Se is negative.
3. The slope of the fs must be high enough to ensure that at i* the desired growth rate will
be higher than (or equal to) the rate of real capital inflows, allowing for a decreasing
(constant) debt/GDP ratio (a key point raised by Moreno-Brid, 1998-1999). This will
send a further positive signal to foreign investors as regards the stability of the debt path.
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